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The Imagination in Kant and Fichte
Virginia López-Domínguez
1 Traditionally,  imagination  has  been  dismissed  or  devalued  by  philosophy.  For
centuries, it was considered a minor and secondary function in the constitution of our
worldview. And this holds true for both its reproductive and productive aspects.
2 Plato  first  introduced  it  as  an  ability  to  reflect  images  (eikona),  to  create  mere
imitations of the tangible, of that which for him was already a copy of the ideas and, for
that reason,  was excluded from the realm of knowledge1.  This  negative view lasted
right up to rationalism, where the theory prevailed that the image is – as Sartre said in
The Imagination – a thing in our consciousness, a dead product, the result of complete
passivity. In fact, Descartes, as well as Leibniz and Spinoza, considered the imagination
as  a  derivative  function,  which  degrades  the  truth  by  presenting  it  in  a  faded  or
confused way, compared to the clarity and distinction, characteristic of innate ideas. It
is  that erratic  character which depends on the attachment of  the imaginary to the
bodies, that darkness that prevents this faculty to give clear account of the real and
achieve the subtlety and perfection of true knowledge, but that does not mean that
their  products  are false  in themselves.  It  is  rather the weakness  of  the will,  which
exceeds  itself  in  judging  and  attributes  to  the  imagined  a  status  that  does  not
correspond to it, refusing to admit that it is neither a perception nor can it be raised to
the level of conceptual thought2.
3 In the second case, that of the creation of new images, the imagination again did not
acquire a good reputation, although it was generally never considered a completely
new  production  but  as  a  different  ordering  of  previously  experienced  data.  It  was
thought  to  build  phantasmata,  operating  on  the  fringes  of  reality  and  producing  a
fantastic and illusory vision, contrary to the truth or, at least, unconcerned by it. Thus
the opinion of the inefficacy and irrelevance of the imagination for science and for the
transformation of the world was consolidated, tuning into a valid instrument only for
the construction of utopias of artists and poets.
4 The view of the imagination changed radically after Kant, because with him, it became
a fundamental active faculty in the process of knowledge. At this point, Kant continued
the work of empiricism, but from a critical perspective. On the one hand, he followed
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Locke and Hume in their  opposition to the theory of  innate ideas and rejected the
epistemic validity of those concepts whose origin does not refer to experience, but he
acknowledged that data of perception are meaningless if  they are not organized by
successive synthesis, which filter and subsume the matter of knowledge under the pure
subjective forms of  sensibility and understanding respectively.  For Kant,  knowledge
begins with experience while for Hume, everything originates in it. Ideas, at least in
their simplest elements, are copies of an effective sensible impression. The imagination
associates them actively and freely, that is, shapes our reality. While memory repeats
impressions,  preserving  to  some  degree  their  original  strength  and  vivacity,  the
imagination is free to modify the order of ideas. It can form complex mental content
from  the  simple  and  even  berak  them  down  in  order  to  reunite  their  elements
according to its whim. It does so, however, following certain rules of association, which
arise from qualities that lie in the ideas themselves, i.e. that the imagination gives a
certain universality to their associations3, although it is a relative universality, because
its norms guide, and even create habits of association, but are not imposed.
5 In  contrast  to  Hume,  Kant  incorporated  the  rules  of  the  imagination  into  the
constitution of knowledge and granted them a universal and necessary value, provided
that they remain under the subordination of the understanding, that is, provided that
they  are  not  “subjective  and  empirical ground  of  reproduction”,  which  he  called
precisely  “association of  representations”  (KrV,  A  121).  In  this  way,  he  managed  to
separate  imagination  from  error  and  falsehood,  but  at  the  same  time  he  gave
imagination the ability to free itself from the intellect in order to become an authentic
creative force, present both in aesthetic experience and in artistic production. He did
this  precisely  to  enhance  its  function  apart  from  the  understanding.  With  this  he
prepared  the  way  for  Fichte,  Schelling  and the  Romantics,  transforming  it  into  an
inventive activity, linked to genius and freedom, but at the same time, builder of our
reality.  Nevertheless,  the  old  fear  of  the  phantasmata,  of  the  arbitrariness  or  the
delirium, made Kant distrust the intervention of the imagination in the moral realm.
And since he had admitted that practical reason is the key vault of the whole edifice of
pure reason (KrV, Einleitung), he was unable to make it into the very center of all the
activity of the subject, as his successors actually did. He simply stayed on the timid
recognition that the ideas of reason are the “analogon” of a schema of sensibility (KrV, A
665 / B 693) and thus implicitly presenting the movement of the imagination as a model
of the antinomic character of pure theoretical reason.
6 However, Kant was aware of the importance of the introduction of imagination in the
Critique of Pure Reason,  and in Lose Blätter (B 12) he acknowledged that it had been a
decisive factor in the construction of Criticism, just as much as the substitution of the
noumena by the transcendental  concept of  object.  He also accepted the influence of
Tetens’ Psychology on this point, who argued that the rules of association implied an
“inner and autonomous activity of the understanding”, which combines the ideas and
starts with experience but is not obtained from it through abstraction4. And perhaps to
avoid such similarity, he insisted on distinguishing himself from him, attributing to
this Psychology an empirical and subjective character, and defining his own analysis as
transcendental and objective. But Tetens had also offered a more unitary model of the
imagination, since for him it was not a separate faculty but an aspect of the faculty of
representation,  that  performed  three  cognitive  functions  attributable  to  different
levels  of  representation:  perception,  imagination  and  fancy  formative  power  or
Dichtkraft5. Somehow, this contributed to Kant considering imagination as a mediating
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faculty  and  trying  to  find,  through  it,  the  synthesis  between  the  two  sources  of
knowledge. In addition, Tetens had taken a step further by trying to explain the genesis
of concepts unitarily. He had offered an epigenetic explanation of the concepts taking
life sciences as a model, an explanation that Kant would record in the second edition of
the Critique, just after reading and reviewing the first two parts of Herder’s Ideas on the
Philosophy of the History of Mankind6. These previous steps culminate in a holistic theory
of human activity, which is precisely that of Fichte, although this does not mean that
there was a direct and decisive influence of these authors on him. Rather, it seems that
regarding the matter of imagination, Fichte takes these ideas from Kant himself and
adapts  them  to  his  concern  of  building  a  system  of  freedom,  taking  into  account
Herder’s suggestions on the need to incorporate the feeling to the basis of reason.
7 Although Kant is ambiguous with regard to the function of the imagination within the
order  of  faculties,  depending  largely  on  whether  it  is  artistic,  productive  (that  is,
transcendental) or reproductive imagination, in the Critique of Pure Reason prevails what
Beck called the theory of radical diversity of the two sources of knowledge7. There are
two separate, independent and irreducible modules or cognitive systems. On the one
hand, there is sensibility, a totally passive faculty, capable of receiving representations
through the pure forms of space and time. On the other hand, there is understanding, a
spontaneous faculty, which enables to know such representations by actively ordering
the data using categories in order to properly conform the object (KrV, A 85 / B 118).
The  double  origin  of  knowledge  has  repercussions  on  its  products  and  thus  the
intuitions and concepts are completely opposite, since the former collect sensory data
and offer the multiplicity and the individual, while the latter are intellectual, universal
and  encompass  what  is  multiple  in  one  unit.  By  being  completely  heterogeneous,
categories can not be directly applied to the phenomenon; they require a mediator
faculty  –  active  and  spontaneous  –  which  is  both  sensible  and  intellectual  (non-
empirical) and manages to bring together the given multiplicity and unify it (A 137 / B
176). This is done through the transcendental scheme, which is not a fixed product, an
“image-thing”,  but  a  rule,  a  procedure,  by  which  the  mind  “draws”  intermediate
representations  that  serve  to  apply  pure  concepts  to  empirical  intuitions.  The
transcendental  scheme  effects  a  sensitization,  that  is  to  say  that  it  makes  a
temporalization of the categories, since time is the general form of sensibility. In this
sense, imagination acts as “a blind function of the soul” (A 78 / B 103). It is not only
that we are not usually aware of its functioning but also that we cannot anticipate what
its final product will be in each of its interventions, because we do not know which of
the categories will be used in the synthesis, for the adoption of a certain perspective to
judge reality is spontaneous and therefore a free choice.
8 Fichte is  completely faithful  to Kant’s  theory of  transcendental  imagination,  but he
presents it from a different conception of philosophy, which will allow him to expand,
deepen, and make it the basic faculty of man. Critical philosophy had established the
conditions of possibility of knowledge through an analysis by which it separated the
distinct faculties at stake and deduced the cognitive functions from their results or
products. For example, from the judgments he came to the categories of understanding.
In explaining the whole of human knowledge, Kant had proceeded from its elements,
and in this progression from one to another,  he created a dichotomous and partial
vision, in which each new phase was added to the previous (per appositionem) without
arising  from  it  as  a  necessary  articulation  (per  intus  susceptionem).  This  was  the
procedure  used  by  Kant,  although  in  the  “Transcendental  Doctrine  of  Method”  he
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suggests another “architectural”. Fichte, however, followed this suggestion. On the one
hand, he wanted to build a system of philosophy and in the context of the age this
meant starting from a single, first, unconditioned principle, and derive all reality from
it. In this way, the transcendental method became genetic. Fichte took his principle,
the last explanatory ground of the system, from the second Critique, from the Kantian
idea that the key to the whole edifice of reason lies in practical reason. And so his
starting point was the Thathandlung,  the absolute action, without further conditions.
This would give rise to a holistic vision, where the unity underlies the different human
faculties, in a globalizing process led by the imagination, which creates new spheres of
freedom, constructing all human activity, whether theoretical, practical, aesthetic or
political.
9 In  order  to  develop  the  imaginative  process  in  Fichte,  I  have  chosen  the
Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, not because in this work there is something truly new
in the evolution of his thought regarding this matter, but because, being a complete
systematization of the entire period of Jena, he perfects and clarifies the exposition of
the  Grundlage  der  gesamten  Wissenschaftslehre,  introducing  further  clarifications;  for
example, the Einleitungen or the Grundlage des Naturrechts, in which Fichte assumes the
criticisms and misinterpretations that his philosophical system has led to. As far as our
subject  matter  is  concerned,  in  this  work  the  relation  between  imagination  and
freedom is better expressed, and to a great extent for this reason the imagination is
shown more clearly as the basic faculty of the subject. Driven by the feelings that arise
from the primary contact of the subject with the world, it operates by attempting the
conjunction of opposing emotions, whereas the understanding (Verstand) is secondary
and dependent on it, since it is passive and merely receives the imaginative process
when it stops and sets at a certain point. This synthesis of opposing emotions is the
expression on the most intimate and subjective level of the integration of the empirical
with the intellectual intuition. In this way, Fichte avoids the hypostasis of the absolute
I, characteristic of the Grundlage by showing that intellectual intuition is a process of
the finite I in which an absolute instance immanent to him is revealed. Finally, in the
Nova methodo it is seen more clearly how Fichte’s approach to imagination points to the
unity,  integrity and totality of  human activity.  That is,  to an organic conception of
subjectivity that does not present the realization of the categorical imperative so much
in the form of duty – as a struggle against inclinations and feelings, as in Kant – but in
the form of coherence, of the law of restitution of the proper balance of homeostatic
processes. This organic view of man and knowledge obeys that both the categories and
the  pure  forms  of  sensibility,  time  and  space,  are  not  accepted  merely  as  facts  of
consciousness for which a condition of possibility is sought, but are rather deduced
from the dynamic itself  of the imaginative process,  a process that can only find its
fullest  sense  when consummated  in  reality  by  assuming  a  material  field  of  action,
which is the human body (Leib) and which in this work is identified with the soul.
10 The beginning and foundation of all consciousness, and therefore of all reality, since
there is no other reality for the subject than what he can understand and grasp, is
freedom in the Nova methodo: 
“die Freiheit ist sonach der erste Grund und die erste Bedingung alles Seyns und
alles Bewusstseins”8.
11 Philosophy’s  mission  is  to  explain  reality,  and  will  have  as  its  starting  point  the
consciousness of freedom, its idea: 
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“der Gedanke der Selbstständigkeit und Freiheit das höchste und erste ist” (MK, 15).
12 This absolute freedom, which can have no other foundation than its own spontaneity
and  which  consequently  proves  to  be  unfounded,  is  an  absolute  activity  of  self-
assertion in which there are no limits of any kind: no subject, or object, or laws. It is
itself subject, object and its own law, although it is clear that this freedom cannot be
attributed to the thing, since in that case the subject could not give account of it. There
is no other possibility than to consider it the self-positioning of the I, pure activity or
Thathandlung, but its character of full unity and indistinction makes it unintelligible: 
“Die  Freiheit  ist  absolute  Selbstaffection  und  weiter  nichts,  sie  ist  aber  kein
Mannigfaltiges, also auch nicht anschaubar” (MK, 59).
13 It is only felt: 
“Das Gefühl ist Affection unserer selbst” (MK, 155).
14 Precisely  because of  the subjective nature,  deprived of  the feeling,  the principle  of
philosophy in the Nova methodo has to be postulated and the confirmation that such a
postulate is true is obtained through the complete development of the system in which
it is shown how the whole process of the I is coherently explained based on it because,
truly, all human activity points to freedom as a goal. It is a circle where the beginning
(the foundation) and the end (the goal) coincide.
15 The  whole  of  Fichte’s  effort  consists  in  making  conceivable  the  inconceivable9,  in
explaining the irrationality on which consciousness is based, that, being separation,
limitation and finitude, presents an absolute, as an aspiration and even as a factum in
the case of moral conscience. He will try to explain it based on finitude, opening it to
the infinite, but without transcending the finite. This is why his next step in the Nova
methodo,  after presenting absolute freedom as a postulate, is to place himself on the
plane of consciousness by avoiding the hypostasis of the absolute I and to admit that
without  self-consciousness,  consciousness  cannot  be  given  or,  in  other  words,  that
there can be no freedom without awareness of freedom: 
“Das  Bestimmte  muss  anschaubar  sein,  denn  nur  unter  Bedingung  seiner
Anschaubarkeit ist Freiheit möglich, welche Bedingung des Bewusstseins ist” (MK
52).
16 This is the point at which effective freedom begins, which, given its close relationship
with the imagination, can only be realized through trials, testing, through a maturity
exercise.
17 Thus, the true starting point of philosophy is the very beginning of consciousness, with
a pure and unconditioned activity of self-assertion that has no effect in the world, for
in that case it would annihilate it without ever being able to distinguish itself from it.
This activity projected into the infinite is defined as tendency or aspiration towards the
absolute (Tendenz,  Streben)  and constitutes  the very presence of  the absolute in the
finite subject. And precisely because of this finitude, the tendency ends up finding an
obstacle in its path of expansion that forces it to return to itself and initiate a re-flexion
– according to the terms of the Grundlage10. The encounter is felt as an impact (Anstoss11)
that serves as an occasion for a centripetal activity of self-determination. It seems as if
the very energy of the I was returned to it because it has been unable to carry it out,
although this implies a resistance, registered by the I through a feeling of limitation.
This gives him the guideline that there is something different from it, a Not-I, which it
has not grasped directly – in situ, as it were, outside itself – but only through its own
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limits, through the effect that the Not-I has produced in him. Hence in the Grundlage,
Fichte affirms that regarding the world we can only have faith (Glaube12).
18 The limitation is  therefore offered subsequently as an inexplicable fact,  as a factum
beyond which one can not go,  but that could not have arisen without the previous
spontaneity  of  the  I,  thereby  recognizing  the  logical-ontological  priority  of  the
affirmation  over  denial  –  of  being  over  nothing.  Freedom,  then,  has  allowed  its
limitation, its linkage, its Gebundenheit, to become concrete, and it has not completely
denied itself because of this, for there is always the possibility that the I does not want
to admit the obstacle and recognize it as such. In fact, this is largely what happens,
because, once the movement of contraction, of reflection of the I, is initiated, it is not
completed until the disappearance of the subject; rather, the tendency, whilst absolute,
replaces the activity until it finds yet another limit. And in that encounter the initial
process occurs again, producing an oscillation (Schweben) of the activity between two
points – one fixed and another mobile – an oscillation that Fichte calls “imagination”
(Einbildungskraft). Those poles between which the imaginative activity moves are the
absolute I, represented by the tendency, and the absolute Not-I, that it is not able to
penetrate. At the extreme points of the oscillation opposite feelings of integrity and
lack  occur  respectively,  so  that  imagination,  as  already  happened in  Kant,  actively
builds synthesis of unity with plurality, of the intellectual with the sensitive. At the
periphery, at the outer limit – as it might be called – arises a feeling of limitation, of
activity that has been restrained or impeded. Fichte calls this a “feeling” (Gefühl), in a
provisional and in a loose sense, identifying it, as he had already done in the Grundlage,
with what in Kant was the moment of the affection, the sensation13. In the center or the
inner limit, there is a feeling of fullness, doubtless very vague, for at this point there is
not really an externalization of the activity: 
“Im Gefühl kommt das ganze unzertheilte Ich vor; sehen können wir das Ich nicht,
aber fühlen” (MK, 78).
19 In  spite  of  its  imprecision,  it  is  necessary  to  admit  this  purely  subjective  or  ideal
moment because in truth it is a certain emotion. It is even the most certain of all, since
without it the restitution of the tendency after its limitation could not be explained. It
is a feeling of affirmation of one’s own being or of affirmation in life, an expression that
will characterize the Fichte of the Berlin stage, but which is already suggested in the
Nova methodo, since the imagination is defined as movement, as deed (That) or liveliness
(Lebendigkeit)  (MK,  202).  Consequently,  we  must  assume  that  its  foundation  is  the
Thathandlung, life, meaning not the biological life, but the spiritual one, which will end
up  expressing  itself  in  the human,  concretizing  into  the  biological  and  seeking
consciousness. Without this feeling of rooting in being and life, the I would let itself die
after encountering the first obstacle of its performance.
20 In any case, the feelings bring to the subject a fact which he cannot doubt, for it is
always the I that feels itself: 
“Ich fühle nicht etwas, sonder ich fühle mich” (MK, 78). 
21 However,  to  become  an  agent  in  the  realm  of  knowledge,  the  feeling  must  be
accompanied by an intuition.  Already in the Grundlage,  Fichte had recognized it  by
paraphrasing Kant: “intuition sees – he said then – but it is empty, the feeling is related to
reality but it is blind”14.
22 And so, the oscillatory game of imagination combines – as Fichte puts it – four pieces
(Stücke) MK, 87: the feeling of limitation, the feeling of aspiration, the intuition of the
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determined object and the intuition of the ideal.  Two feelings and two intuitions: a
finite intuition,  limited in some respect and variable in each moment,  which is  the
sensible  intuition,  and  an  intuition  of  the  absolute  and  infinite,  the  intellectual
intuition,  which  is  the  fixed  and immovable  pole  without  which  the  consciousness
would be lost trying to find support for its construction.
23 In  this  movement  of  reception  and  comprehension  of  data  by  subsumption  of  the
plurality to the unity, the I is tense and distended as in a movement of systole and
diastole15,  by  which  it  extends  its  activity  and  contracts  it  by  admitting  the  cuts
occurring in it. It is for this reason that Fichte describes the imaginative function as
pulling lines (Linienziehen) or as projecting (Entwerfen, MK 110, 201 n.; GNR, SW III, 58).
What  is  outlined  in  each  case  are  the  oscillating,  variable  limits  of  the  I  and,  by
reference to  them,  the contours  of  the  world  are  also  drawn.  As  Kant  had already
proven in the “Refutation of Idealism”, world and consciousness are always correlative;
consciousness is in a sense the world and the world is consciousness. Or, in Fichte's
words: 
“Ich bin nicht ohne Welt, und meine Welt nicht ohne mich” (MK, 223).
24 As we have said, consciousness develops between limits that are impenetrable, so that
the  reality  that  it  comprises  is  also  limited.  However,  it  cannot  renounce  absolute
activity, which, although it is unrealizable, remains in consciousness as it did from the
beginning, under the form of a now limited aspiration or tendency, which Fichte calls
drive,  impulse  (Trieb).  This  energetic  and  dynamic  aspect  –  which  unquestionably
reminds us of Freud, if we ignore the libidinal content of the Freudian drives – allows
Fichte  to  explain  the  imagination  as  a  unitary  process  that  intervenes  both
theoretically and practically.
25 In the realm of praxis the oscillation does not stop at the obstacle. Undoubtedly, the I
becomes aware of it, but tries to extend its activity beyond the limit by imagining a
practical project (das Ideal), which, as in Sartre16, has a direct relation to the restriction
that the I discovered in the affirmation of its activity, because the project is imagined in
order to solve the shortcomings that the subject found in its action. Such an extension
of the activity is always accompanied by feelings that help the I become aware of what
is happening in it. Since for Fichte there is no feeling without action and vice versa,
there is no action without feeling, for the latter is considered the internal, the purely
subjective side of the activity: 
“Kein Gefühl ohne Handeln, kein Handeln ohne Gefühl” (MK 138).
26 This  process  of  projection of  the subjective activity,  insofar  as  it  is  impelled by an
absolute tendency,  is  potentially  infinite.  For this  reason,  the I  puts as  its  ultimate
purpose the full subjectivation of the world, its unrestricted affirmation, the absolute I,
and this is what Fichte calls “idea” (Idee) of the I. It is an idea for reason, which operates
at every moment of the subject’s realization of his aspiration, and which, like all ideas,
is only an unrealizable goal for the finite I. In the first place, by the very structure of
consciousness that does nothing but move between boundaries. Second, because of the
insurmountable physical barrier that death imposes on the empirical subject.
27 In the realm of theory, however, the I stops its movement by accepting its limitation
and fixing in a product the synthesis that it obtained at that moment. We will return to
how this  process  is  performed.  For  now it  is  worth  emphasizing  that  imagination,
insofar as it is directly related to freedom, achieves a wider productivity in the praxis,
since  it  allows  to  modify  the  world  according  to  a  project  of  affirmation  of  the
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subjectivity  that  does  not  admit  the  confines  that  are  imposed  from  outside  and,
consequently, denies the world in order to create a more harmonic environment.
28 Evidently, imagination is presented in the Doctrine of Science as pure dynamism of
constitution, as a movement of synthesis between the infinite and the finite, between
the  ideal  and  the  real,  the  intelligible  and  the  sensible,  unity  and  multiplicity,  or
ultimately between the I and the Not-I, thus collecting the etymological meaning of the
German word Einbildungskraft, as a unifying force, which forms in unity. As in Kant, its
main function is productive; it is to create projects and not imitations or reproductions
(MK 53). Although in Fichte’s case, it is a more radical constructivism, which allows him
to define the I as an eye and not as a mirror that is limited to reflect reality (MK 54).
This  distinction between project  and imitation is  perfectly  captured in the German
language. The imagination is primarily the ability to elaborate Vorbilder, that is, types
or models prior to the finished image,  which guide its  construction;  not Nachbilder,
mere  images,  which  are  the  result  of  the  process  and  therefore  something  fixed,
sclerosed, a product in a sense already reified. That is why it is interesting to note the
fact  that  in  his  book  on  the  imagination  Sartre  affirms  that  the  great  error  of
philosophy has been the consideration of the image as an object or a thing17, forgetting
the contribution of transcendental idealism, not only the contribution of Fichte, but
also  that  of  Kant.  However,  unlike  Kant,  Fichte’s  treatment  of  the  imagination  is
primary, since his explanation is genetic (MK, 192) and ultimately goes back to the
absolute spontaneity of the I. The unity of the principle has repercussions on the unity
of the imaginative process,  whose root is  in the activity of a single drive,  and thus
Fichte can extend the use of  the imagination from the theoretical  to  the practical,
making it the basic faculty of man:
“Im Denken ist kein Fliessen, da ist lauter Stehen, bloss in der Einbildungskraft ist
die Basis alles Bewusstseins, soll das Bewusstsein dieses Fliessens sein”. (MK 208 n.)
29 The centrality of the imagination in Fichte is reinforced by his deducing it from its very
internal dynamics of the pure forms of knowing, something which does not occur in
Kant, for in his works there is no genetic explanation of the pure intuitions of space
and time nor of the categories.
30 As in the Grundlage, in the Nova methodo the categories are moments of the imaginative
movement, of the unfolding and contraction of the subjective activity, which are fixed
by the absolute spontaneity of the I (reason = Vernunft), becoming passive products, in
concepts of an understanding that is only limited to accept the syntheses obtained18.
31 As  far  as  time  is  concerned,  the  Grundlage offers  suggestions  for  its  deduction  by
asserting that it is the conflict of the imagination with itself what distorts the condition
of the I  to a temporary moment (SW I,  217).  But it  is in the Nova methodo,  where a
detailed exposition of this question appears in which the origin of time is again linked
to the imaginative work:
“Jeder  einzelne  Moment  eine  Dauer  hat,  diese  entsteht  aus  dem  Schweben  der
Einbildungskraft  zwischen  Entgegegesetzten.  Darin  besteht  die  Einbildungskraft,
dass ich unendliche theilbares fasse, erst in diesen Zusammenfassen ensteht der
Moment” (MK 206).
32 One of the opposites to which Fichte refers in this passage is the intellectual intuition,
which I had just characterized as timeless (MK 136), an intuition that reveals an I that,
by its absolute presence, is perpetual activity: eternity. The other opposite is the Not-I,
a set of the different limitations endured by the activity as plurality versus absolute
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subjective unity. To become intelligible, this chaotic set requires order, it must become,
as  Fichte  says,  a  series,  a  sequence  (MK  88).  But  at  the  same  time,  the  multiple
sensations of the I can only be related and ordered in a succession if there is a point of
reference always identical to itself, which is precisely the intellectual intuition. Thus,
time is defined as the form of the multiple of intuition (MK 130) or as mediator between
the sensible or the intelligible (MK 136 n.) and, in turn, as the connection that we are
forced to put to our representations (MK 192). This connection is neither arbitrary nor
external  to  the  I.  It  arises  from  the  tension  and  distention  of  the  activity  in  the
imaginative process. By introducing the temporal relation, consciousness is constituted
as such, it differs from that accumulation of mechanically associated data by referring
the series to itself, by adjudicating succession as its product. Thus, time is a peculiarity
of consciousness itself;  it  is  the form that the I  gives to itself  when it  is  related to
multiplicity.  Moreover,  time becomes the ontological structure of the finite subject,
where the being of the I is transformed into a progression. When the I wants to assert
itself  over the world and it  finds obstacles to its expansion, it  is  forced to look for
alternative ways, to oscillate between different options, to disperse its affirmation, to
decompress  it  –  as  Sartre  would  say19 –  finally  seeking  its  own  reunification.  The
concept of the purpose is then sketched out and, by outlining this goal, the duration is
also  created,  because,  thanks  to  sensitive  mediations,  successive  actions  arise  to
achieve this goal, the means that are linked in time to their end (MK 206 n.). In other
words – which undoubtedly remind Sartre again – the I has to be completed in its unity
and is forced to exist in the diasporic form of temporality.
33 Moreover, it is interesting to note that the deduction of time has inevitably been linked
to its negation, to eternity. And vice versa, eternity is only given in reference to time. If
Fichte had not recognized that intuition brings us into contact with the eternal, with
something outside  of  time,  he  would  have  explained the  metaphysical  with  proper
physical  coordinates.  But  if  he  had  not  closely  linked  the  eternal  to  the  temporal
through the  productive  imagination,  he  would  have  become dogmatic  leading  to  a
mystique of the absolute, in which the individual would be absorbed by the totality. It is
thus possible to present this link as one more attempt to emphasize the critical nature
of his philosophy and his will to deepen human finitude.
34 As for the deduction of space, no reference is found in the exposition of the Doctrine of
Science of 1794-95.  The first  reference appears in paragraph V of  the Grundlage des
Naturrechts. The Nova methodo incorporates this deduction by completing the theory of
the imagination.  As  in  the  case  of  time,  the  explanation goes  back to  the  absolute
activity of the I, to the freedom that, being limited, requires a sphere of action (MK
114), which necessarily has to be in the Not-I and, therefore, must be material. In the
face of an obstacle, imagination is set in motion, which outlines the limits of the I, and
in doing so creates space as a  form of  external  intuition (MK 111).  The parallelism
between this phase and that of the genesis of time reveals that it is a single process,
that of the derivation of multiplicity, considered from two different perspectives, and
allows to affirm that for Fichte space is externalized time, alienated and reified outside
the subject. Thus, objects external to the I are always given in space and, conversely,
space is always bound to objects (MK 112). Finally, matter is presented by Fichte as a
subjective  synthesis  between space  and objects,  making  it  clear  that  the  sphere  of
deduced  action  is  the  corporeal  world  (die  Körperwelt,  MK  112  n.).  Now,  the  space
between the different corporeal objects is relative and this could not arise if there were
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no fixed point from which to organize it, just as it is impossible to create a temporal
sequence if no reference is made to an inalterable axis and outside time as represented
by intellectual intuition. In this way, it is also necessary to formulate an absolute space
(MK 114), generated from an identical point that for each particular I is its own body
(MK 124). Thus, in a similar way as was already done in the Grundlage des Naturrechts,
also in the Nova methodo the deduction of space is associated with the deduction of the
body as a system of sensibility – whose existence is noted by the subject – of what
Fichte calls “original feeling” (Urgefühl, MK 139). At the same time, as in that work, the
deduction of  corporality  leads to  the deduction of  other  individuals  (MK 150),  of  a
material community, which serves as a sphere of manifestation of freedom, an indirect
manifestation, that is always mediated by the immediate sphere of realization of the
freedom of each one, which is the own body20. In this way, the body presents itself as an
instrument of action in the world, but also – as Sartre said21 – as a way of adapting our
consciousness to the world, with which it identifies itself. Precisely for this reason, for
Fichte,  the feeling that is at the basis of the uptake and assumption of our body is
primary, it is the feeling that reveals our individuality, fundamentally our limitation,
and therefore  also  our  conscience.  Hence,  in  its  eagerness  to  accentuate  the  finite
character of man, the Nova methodo culminates in the defense of the inseparability of
body and spirit (MK 160), and the full identification of body and soul (MK 171) for it is a
single reality, the same I perceived sensibly, but from two different strands: that of the
external and that of the internal sense22.
35 By way of concluding this brief summary of the imaginative function, we can say that
the greatest contribution of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo is to have placed the
imagination at the center of all human activity, presenting it in a unitary way. Fichte
prefers to refer to it using the geometric images that were dear to him in his youth, for
example, almost at the end of the Nova methodo, he says that consciousness is a circle
whose center is the intelligible, inseparable from the infinite, from which it extends,
radiating through the imagination to the periphery, according to the necessary laws of
thinking that connect the outer edge to its center allowing it to contain everything that
is empirical and sensitive (MK 207). However, the process that is described is not so
much a function of mathematical reason in its constructive power, but the creative and
vital capacity of an organism in which homeostatic laws govern. On this matter Fichte,
like most intellectuals of his time, has passed from the admiration of more geometrico of
Spinoza  to  an  organic  and  teleological  vision23,  which  is  precisely  the  one  that  is
announced at the end of the Nova methodo and allows him to think nature as analogon of
freedom. Fichte presents the human activity in a unitary and comprehensive way, as a
dynamic process in which all the elements are put together, deepening the suggestion
that Kant had made about the organic character of the reason24, complemented by the
idea that  there  is  an epigenetic  theory,  that  allows to  explain the synthesis  of  the
categories from the transcendental apperception25.
36 Thus, at the beginning of the process is the undeveloped totality, that is, the tendency
to the absolute, and, just as in an organism, that initial germ grows and matures in
contact with the world in a game of action and reaction that ends up doing synthesis
with that world in order to survive. In this game of exchange, the organism creates its
own organs, which in this case, are the structures of the subject: time, space, concepts,
practical projects, and so on. And the process of homeostasis itself creates them by
maintaining an internal balance, which requires parallelism and complementarity of
the opposing elements. Thus the feeling corresponds to intuition, intellectual intuition
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with the sensible, space with time, intuitions with concepts, categories arise in pairs,
which find a synthesis in the third of each group, and the body with the soul.
37 Each one of the organs is important, necessary, because they all obey the end of the
whole organism. Every moment is preserved without one displacing or replacing the
other, even the most primitive, which are integrated by the higher moments. The final
end is the realization of the effective freedom of the organism by intermingling with
others,  its  full  development  in  the  world,  the  affirmation  of  its  laws  above  the
irrational.  The  creative  capacity  that  realizes  this  process  of  subjectivation  of  the
world, the synthesis, is the productive imagination. This subjectivation is only partial
in  knowledge,  since  the  representations  are  determined  by  a  feeling  of  necessity,
whereas,  in  praxis,  the  subjectivation,  besides  being  ideal,  is  real  and,  therefore,
complete. Although it is limited by the particularity of individuals and the duration of
their  physical  life,  so  that  this  process  is  posed as  a  task  extended to  the  infinite,
achievable gradually by humanity alone. And if the imagination can assume this basic
and  transforming  function  it  is  because  it  is a  movement  between  two  poles,  a
“between” that bridges lie on the gap that separates the intelligible and the sensible.
Although the absolute can be the ultimate referent and the source that contains the
mystery of life, the truth is that reality, consciousness and effective freedom, are in the
interstice.  Thus  the  Fichtean  theory  of  imagination  in  the  Wissenschaftslehre  nova
methodo shows us the absolute from the finite, a finitude that is consummated with the
deduction of the body, a deduction that is realized through the imagination.
NOTES
1. Plato, The Republic, 510 n.
2. Descartes, R., Metaphysical Meditations VI (Tr. Morente: Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 2006, 121, 131,
175).
3. “according to itself given any time and place“, Hume, D., Treatise I, I, Sec. IV, 10. 
4. Tetens, J. N., Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung, Riga, 1776,
vol. I, 320.
5. B 12, R 5635, E 67. Cfr. Beck, L. W., Early German Philosophy. Kant and his Predecessors. Cambridge
Mass.,  the  Belknap  Press  of  Harvard  University,  1969,  412-125  and  Allison,  H.  E.:  Kant´s
Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-historial Commentary. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015,
153 n.
6. Kant, KrV, Parag. 27, B 166-168. In view of this text, Mensch argues that “Kant knew that his
theory moved between Locke, Condillac and Bonnet”. Cfr. Mensch, Jennifer, Kant´s Organisation:
Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy. Chicago, University Chicago Press, 2013. See
also: KrV, 113 n.
7. Kant, KrV, A 50/B 74; Beck, op. cit., 268-269.
8. Fichte, J. G., Doctrine of Science nova methodo, 46, 51. The edition used here corresponds to the
Krause Manuscript in the version of Erich Fuchs, appeared in Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1982, from
now on: MK. 
The Imagination in Kant and Fichte
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 17 | 2018
11
9. Fichte, ZEWL, SW I, 461 and WL, SW X, 114. Mme. De Stäel sums up Fichte's philosophy with the
following formula: "Il faut comprendre l'incomprehensible comme tel" (De l'Allemagne IV, 253), which
Fichte himself uses in a letter to Reinhold to define his thought. See Ruckerinnungen, Antworten
und Fragen, par. 7 and 8, SW V, 341 n.
10. Fichte, GWL, SW I, see the “Deduction of representation”.
11. GWL, SW I, 212, 228, among others.
12. GWL, SW I, 301 and 328.
13. MK, 68. See also GWL, SW I, 134 n. and ZEWL, SW I, 490.
14. SW I, 319. See also MK, 71, 79 n. and 87.
15. The expression is used by Novalis in Allgemeines Brouillon to refer to the two movements of the
divine life, which are expressed both within the subject and in nature. Novalis Werke (ed. Edward
Wasmuth), Heidelberg, 1957, IV, 446.
16. Being and Nothingness, Part II, Cap. IV: “The for-itself and the being of the possible”.
17. Sartre, J. P., The Imagination. Tr. Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1978, 22 n.
18. In this way, Fichte gathers the etymological meaning of the German word Verstand, as what
remains, MK 32 n.
19. Being and Nothingness, Part II, Cap.II. “Ontology of temporality”.
20. On this matter, see my article: “Die Idee des Leibes im Jenaer System”, in Fichte Studien XVI
(1999), 273-293.
21. Being and Nothingness, Part III, Cap. II, 1: “The body as being for-itself: facticity”
22. Fichte, WLnM, Halle Manuskript, GA IV, 2, 139.
23. Among  these  contemporaries  we  shall  mention  Herder,  Goethe  and  Schelling.  Fichte
implicitly uses Herder's notion of organism, whose laws of behavior have not only served to
explain evolution in nature but also in history. On this latter application, see, e.g., Ideas on the
Philosophy of the History of Mankind, Part III, Chap. XV, 2 and 3. It is interesting to note that many
of the principles used by Herder pass to Lamarck, although restricted to the purely biological
sphere, as well as to H. Spencer, as he applies them in this case, also to society. It is also to be
noted that the shift of theoretical interest from mathematics to life sciences already occurs in
Leibniz,  since,  for  him,  medicine  was  the  model  science.  This  is  reflected,  of  course,  in  his
metaphysics and,  in particular,  in the idea of  substance as a monad. Cf.  Smith,  Justin:  Divine
Machines. Leibniz and the Sciences of Life. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011.
24. KrV, BXXIII; BXXXVII n. and B 860 n./ A 832 n.
25. KrV, Par. 27, B 166-168. See Zöller, G., “Kant on the Generation of Metaphysical Knowledge”,
in Kant. Analysen-Probleme-Kritik. Würzbug, Könighausen & Neumann, 1988, p. 85 n. and Moya, E.,
“Apriorismo, epigénesis y evolución” in Revista de Filosofía, 30, 2 (2005), 61-88.
ABSTRACTS
Traditionally, imagination has been dismissed or devalued by philosophy. For centuries, it was
considered a minor and secondary function in the constitution of our worldview. And this holds
true for both its reproductive and productive aspects. In this paper, it will be argued that the
view of the imagination changed radically after Kant, because he considered imagination not
only a fundamental active faculty in the process of knowledge but also an authentic creative
force, present both in aesthetic experience and in artistic production. With this he prepared the
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way for Fichte, Schelling and the Romantics, transforming it into an inventive activity, linked to
genius and freedom, but at the same time, builder of our reality. Fichte is completely faithful to
Kant’s  theory of  transcendental  imagination,  but,  as  it  will  be argued,  he presents  it  from a
different conception of philosophy, which will allow him to expand, deepen, and make it the
basic faculty of man. Fichte took his principle, the last explanatory ground of the system, from
the second Critique,  from the Kantian idea that the key to the whole edifice of reason lies in
practical reason. And so his starting point was the Thathandlung,  the absolute action, without
further  conditions.  This  would  give  rise  to  a  holistic  vision,  where  the  unity  underlies  the
different human faculties, in a globalizing process led by the imagination, which creates new
spheres of freedom, constructing all human activity, whether theoretical, practical, aesthetic or
political.
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